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Abstract
We analyze a di⁄erential game describing the interactions between a ￿rm that might
be violating competition law and the antitrust authority. The objective of the authority is
to minimize social costs (loss in consumer surplus) induced by an increase in prices above
marginal costs. It turns out that the penalty schemes which are used now in EU and US
legislation appear not to be as e¢ cient as desired from the point of view of minimization
of consumer loss from price-￿xing activities of the ￿rm. In particular, we prove that full
compliance behavior is not sustainable as a Nash Equilibrium in Markovian strategies over
the whole planning period, and, moreover, that it will never arise as the long-run steady-
state equilibrium of the model. We also investigate the question which penalty system
enables us to completely deter cartel formation in a dynamic setting. We found that this
socially desirable outcome can be achieved in case the penalty is an increasing function of
the degree of o⁄ence and is negatively related to the probability of law enforcement.
JEL-Classi￿cation: L41, K21, C73 .
Keywords: Antitrust Policy, Antitrust Law, Dynamic games
1 Introduction.
In this paper we incorporate speci￿c features of antitrust law enforcement, which are in practice
now in the US and the European Union, into a dynamic framework of utility maximization with
two players having con￿ icting objectives. In the particular case of violations of antitrust law,
those two players are the ￿rm of regulated monopoly type, which rises prices above marginal
costs level or the ￿rm, which participates in cartel agreements, and the Antitrust Authority,
whose aim is to prevent price-￿xing or cartel formation in the industry.
￿The author thanks Eric van Damme and Peter Kort for stimulating discussions and valuable comments.
yTilburg University, Department of Econometrics & Operations Research and CentER, tel: (+31) 134663244,
e-mail: E.I.Motchenkova@uvt.nl.
1According to the US sentencing guidelines for organizations (2001) and the guidelines on the
method of setting ￿nes imposed for violations of competition law in Europe (1998), the penalty
schemes for antitrust violations are based mainly on the gravity of the violations, which is
determined on the basis of the turnover involved in the infringement. To be more precise,
in the European regulation the penalty imposed depends on the gravity and duration of the
infringement in a linear manner. The level of o⁄ence is measured by the turnover involved
in the infringement, which is de￿ned as the total sales of the product involved over the whole
period of existence of the cartel. In the US sentencing guidelines for organizations the system of
￿ne imposition for antitrust violations is di⁄erent. There we observe that the penalty schedule
for the base ￿ne is represented by a convex increasing function of the level of o⁄ence.
In order to investigate the e¢ ciency of the current penalty schemes we incorporate these two
features of penalty systems for antitrust law violations into a dynamic model of intertemporal
utility maximization by modelling penalty schedule in the stylized form as a linear or quadratic
functions of the degree of price-￿xing and time. Similar to Feichtinger (1983) the set up of
the problem leads to a di⁄erential game. The authorities attempt to minimize the social loss
caused by price-￿xing, whereas the ￿rm wants to maximize the pro￿t gained from price-￿xing.
It is found that the stylized form of the existing penalty schemes would not succeed, in the
sense that it cannot provide complete deterrence. Therefore, we try to ￿nd a more e¢ cient
functional form of penalty schedule for violations of antitrust law. Finally, we suggest a new
penalty system which is most e¢ cient from the point of view of complete deterrence of cartel
formation in dynamic settings.
We relate our analysis to the general literature on crime and punishment, starting with
Becker (1968). In his seminal paper, Becker (1968) studied the problem of how many resources
and how much punishment should be used to enforce di⁄erent kinds of legislation. The decision
instruments are the expenditures on police and courts in￿ uencing the probability that the
o⁄ender is convicted, and the type and size of punishment for those convicted. The goal was
to ￿nd those expenditures and punishments that minimize the total social loss. This loss is the
sum of damages from o⁄ences, costs of apprehension and conviction, and costs of carrying out
the punishment imposed.
The main contribution of Becker￿ s work was to demonstrate that the best policies to combat
illegal behavior were part of an optimal allocation of resources. Becker (1968) investigates this
problem using a static economic approach to crime and punishment. He derives that in a static
environment the optimal ￿ne should be a multiple of the social cost of the crime and inversely
2related to the probability of detection. So, since an increase in the probability of control causes
an increase in the costs of detection, the least costly policy for the antitrust authority would
be to decrease the probability of control and increase the ￿ne itself. But in this case legal
limitations concerning the upper bound of ￿ne can exist. And this poses the problem. Later, in
Leung (1991), Feichtinger (1983), Fent et al. (1999) and (2003) dynamic (intertemporal) trade-
o⁄s between the damages generated from the o⁄ences and the costs of the control instruments
were studied. More precisely, there papers try to determine a mix of policy variables, like
prevention, treatment and law enforcement, which minimize the discounted stream of total
social loss.
Now we give a more detailed review of the papers related to the problem, addressed in the
current paper. Leung (1991) introduces a dynamic model of optimal punishment, where the
optimal ￿ne is calculated as a solution to an optimal control problem. This model considerably
improves the e¢ ciency and cost e⁄ectiveness if compared to the static mechanism of Becker
(1968). It was found that the optimal ￿ne is negatively related to the o⁄ender￿ s returns from en-
gaging in some criminal activity and positively related to the social cost of the crime. Moreover,
the author ￿nds that the ￿ne which would block the crime can actually be less than the harm
induced by the infringement, which contradicts the result of Becker. Leung argues that Becker￿ s
approach will not generate the optimal outcome, i.e. the outcome which maximizes welfare,
in a dynamic environment. In fact, according to Leung (1991) it would cause overcomplience
because the multiple ￿ne imposes too heavy a penalty on the o⁄ender.
A considerably di⁄erent approach was suggested in Fent et al. (1999) and (2003). They
investigated optimal law enforcement strategies in case punishment is modelled as a function
depending not only on the intensity of crime (o⁄ence rate) but also on the o⁄enders prior
criminal record. This idea was adopted in Fent et al. (1999) in an optimal control model with
the aim to discover the optimal intertemporal strategy of a pro￿t maximizing o⁄ender under
a given, static punishment policy in the model with only one agent. In Fent et al.(2003) the
framework described above was extended to an intertemporal approach of utility maximization,
considering two players with con￿ icting objectives. The authorities attempt to minimize the
social loss caused by criminal o⁄ences, whereas the o⁄ending individual wants to maximize
the pro￿t gained from o⁄ending. This leads to a di⁄erential game, which makes it possible to
study competitive interactions in a dynamic framework. The criminal record takes the role of
a state variable. A high record increases the punishment an o⁄ender expects in case of being
convicted.
3Modelling intertemporal trade-o⁄s requires application of tools like dynamic programming,
optimal control theory and, if there is strategic interaction between players, di⁄erential games.
All the papers mentioned above investigate the problem of optimal dynamic law enforcement
and minimization of social loss from crime by modelling the interactions between the o⁄ender,
who commits the crime, and the authority, whose aim is to prevent the crime. In this paper
we suggest a similar approach. We analyze a di⁄erential game between the o⁄ender and the
authority, whose aim is to prevent the crime, to study the situation of violation of antitrust law
by the ￿rm, which performs price-￿xing activities or participates in a cartel.
Technically our analysis will be close to the paper by Feichtinger (1983), in which he studies
violations of criminal law by means of a di⁄erential game solution to a model of competition
between a thief and the police. We extend his framework by allowing for the penalty for
violation to vary over time. Moreover, we introduce the ￿ne as a function of the current degree
of o⁄ence and probability of law enforcement at each instant of time.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set up the model describing the intertem-
poral game played between a ￿rm engaged in price-￿xing and the antitrust authority, and recall
the modi￿ed static microeconomic model of price-￿xing. In section 3 the di⁄erential game will
be solved and we show that it is impossible to have complete deterrence under current European
and US systems of penalties for antitrust violations. In section 4 a new penalty scheme, which
gives the desired outcome with no collusion, will be suggested. Section 5 provides a summary
of our results and outlines possible extensions and generalizations of the model. Finally, in
appendixes we provide proofs of the main results of the paper.
2 Description of the problem.
A model is designed to determine optimal penalty schemes for antitrust violations and cartel
deterrence in the framework of di⁄erential games. There are two types of agents. First, there
are the ￿rms, which can perform illegal activities, such as price-￿xing and cartel formation or
violations of the price limits imposed by the authority on the regulated monopoly. They obtain
strictly positive gains from price-￿xing in each period, that the cartel was present in the market.
Second, we have the antitrust authority, which can inspect those ￿rms, and, in case violation is
detected, punish them by imposing a ￿ne s(t), where t re￿ ects the time index.. The interactions
of the agents are modelled as a continuous time problem with planning horizon (0;T); where
T < 1:
4The aim of the ￿rm is to dynamically maximize its total expected gain from increase of
price above competitive level over time by choosing q(t): We will call this variable the degree
of illegal activities with respect to price-￿xing ( analogous to the ￿ pilfering rate￿in the model
of competition between thief and police in Feichtinger (1983)). This variable will be described
in more detail in the subsection 2.1, which deals with the microeconomic model underlying the
problem of ￿ghting price-￿xing agreements.
The antitrust authority is modelled as a second decision maker. It also has one instrument,
which is the ￿ rate of law enforcement￿ (or probability of control by the antitrust authority)
p(t) . The aim of the antitrust authority is to maximize welfare. This implies that the rents
from collusion for the ￿rms need to be reduced. So the aim of the antitrust authority is to
prevent cartel formation at the lowest possible costs.
The pro￿t of the ￿rm in each period or the rent from collusion per period above the com-
petitive pro￿t (￿c = 0) is ￿(t) > 0.
Moreover, in order to be able to set up the model and determine the objective functionals
of both players, we ￿rst describe the static microeconomic model of price-￿xing and de￿ne our
terms.
2.1 Static microeconomic model of price-￿xing.
Let us consider an industry with M symmetric ￿rms engaged in a price ￿xing agreement.
Assume that they can agree and increase prices from Pc = c to P > c each; where c is the
marginal cost in the industry. Since ￿rms are symmetric, each of them has equal weight in the
coalition and consequently total cartel pro￿ts will be divided equally among them.1 Hence, the
whole market for the product (in which the price-￿xing agreement has been achieved) will be
divided equally among M ￿rms, so each ￿rm operates in a speci￿c market in which the inverse
demand function equals P(Q) = 1 ￿ Q. They are identical in all submarkets. Under these
assumptions we can simplify the setting by considering not the whole cartel (group of violators)
but only one ￿rm, and apply similar sanctions to all the members of cartel.2
Let Pm be the monopoly price in the industry under consideration, and P = 1 ￿ Q is the
1We also assume that there is no strategic interaction between the ￿rms in the coalition in the sense that we
abstract from the possibility of self-reporting or any other non-cooperative behavior of the ￿rms towards each
other.
2Of course, in these settings the incentives of the ￿rms to betray the cartel can not be taken into account and
the possibility to in￿ uence the internal stability of the cartel is not feasible. But this is the topic for another
paper.
5inverse demand for a particular ￿rm. In order to be able to represent consumer surplus and
extra pro￿ts from price ￿xing for the ￿rm (￿) in terms of the degree of collusion, we specify the
variable q; which denotes the degree of price-￿xing. Let q = P￿c
Pm￿c;where P is the price level
agreed by the ￿rms. Then it holds that q 2 [0;1] and extra pro￿ts from price ￿xing for this




￿ q)(Pm ￿ c)2:
Let (Pm ￿ c)2 = A: With linear demand P = 1 ￿ Q we observe that Pm = 1+c
2 ; so that
1￿c
Pm￿c = 2 and, consequently, it holds that A =
(1￿c)2
4 = ￿m (monopoly pro￿t in this particular
market).
The producer surplus, consumer surplus and net loss in consumer surplus are represented
in Figure 1.
P
     a         CS
                               net loss in CS
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Figure 1: Representation of producer and consumer surpluses and net loss of consumer
surplus in the price-quantity diagram.
The Producer Surplus equals
PS(q) = ￿(q) = ￿mq(2 ￿ q) ;









￿m(2 ￿ q)2 :
Under the assumption that ￿m is equal to 1
4 (or c = 0), these three functions are presented in
Figure 2.


























Figure 2: Consumer surplus, producer surplus and net loss of consumer surplus as continuous
di⁄erentiable functions of the degree of price-￿xing.
The consumer surplus is lower the higher the degree of collusion. The loss in consumer
surplus is higher the higher the degree of collusion, while the rents from cartel for the ￿rm are
higher the higher the degree of collusion.
It should be mentioned that in the literature two main objectives of the authority are
considered. First, the authority aims to maximize total welfare, i.e. the sum of consumer and
producer surpluses. Second, the authority￿ s aim could be to maximize consumer surplus and
at the same time minimize the rents from collusion for the ￿rm. The second approach can be
justi￿ed by the fact that the rents obtained through illegal activities are lost for society in most
of the cases. So they should not be included in the regulator￿ s maximization function.
Let us consider the ￿rst problem in a static setting. The antitrust authority is aimed to
maximize (CS + PS) i.e. to maximize f1
2￿m(2 ￿ q)2 + ￿mq(2 ￿ q)g s.t. q 2 [0;1]: So, given
q 2 [0;1] the total welfare is maximized when q = 0: Note, that this is equivalent to the
minimization of NLCS.
Let us consider now the second problem in a static setting. The antitrust authority is
aimed to maximize CS and at the same time minimize the rents from collusion, i.e. keeping
PS = 0 equal to competitive pro￿t. In other words, the sum of net loss of consumer surplus
and producer surplus will be minimized. This means that the problem can be rewritten to
minimizef￿mq(2￿q)+ 1
2￿mq2g: This is equivalent to minimize f(2q￿ 1
2q2)￿mg; which is equal
to the minimization of the total loss from price-￿xing for society. Consequently, in the settings
where antitrust authority cares only about CS the social welfare will be maximized when there
is no collusion.
So we can conclude that in the static setting the two problems described above are equivalent
in the sense that antitrust authority should not allow for any collusion irrespective of whether
7it cares about total welfare of the society or only about the consumer surplus. The same holds
in a dynamic setting. The aim of the antitrust authority will thus be to achieve q = 0 in all the
periods of the planning horizon in a dynamic setting as well.
2.2 Description of the dynamic game.
To investigate the interactions between the ￿rm and the antitrust authority we develop a dif-
ferential game. We consider a ￿rm (player 2) playing against the antitrust authority (player
1). The probability that the ￿rm gets caught at time t , F(t), is in￿ uenced by the degree of
collusion of the ￿rm, q(t), as well as the law enforcement rate of the antitrust authority p(t),
in the following manner:
:
F(t) = p(t)q(t)[1 ￿ F(t)] (1)
Note that ￿(t) =
:
F(t)[1 ￿ F(t)]￿1 is the hazard rate of the process leading to conviction
of the ￿rm. ￿(t) is the conditional probability of getting caught at time t provided that the
￿rm has not yet been caught. (1) says that the hazard rate ￿ increases linearly with increasing
activities of the ￿rm and antitrust authority, and F(0) = 0 is the initial condition.
As usual two types of variables appear in the model: a state variable F(t) (the probability
distribution function of the time until the detection of the violation of the ￿rm) and control
instruments q(t) (degree of collusion of the ￿rm) and p(t) (law enforcement rate of antitrust
authority). Note that the state constraint 0 ￿ F(t) ￿ 1 is satis￿ed automatically. The idea to
use F(t) as a state variable is based on Kamien and Schwartz (1971). Assume also that a once
convicted ￿rm is not able to collude any more until time T (so if punishment is harsh enough,
the ￿rm needs a lot of time to recover). Parameter r denotes discount rate.




e￿rt[￿(NLCS(t) + C(p(t)))[1 ￿ F(t)] + s(t)
:
F(t)]dt ￿ e￿rTC1(T)[1 ￿ F(T)] (2)
The term C(p(t)) re￿ ects the costs for the antitrust authority of performing the checking
activities (such as the number of inspections, salaries for auditors, etc.). The analysis of the
game will be conducted for the case when costs of law enforcement are quadratic, i.e. C(p) =
Np2(t)3: The instantaneous consumer surplus, CS(t); is negatively related to q(t) ( the higher
the q, the higher the degree of collusion, the less competition in the market, thus the higher the
3However, the results obtained in the paper hold for costs of law enforcement being any increasing convex
function of p. Solution of the game for linear case C(p) = Np is available from the author upon request.
8price). The term NLCS(t) re￿ ects the loss in instantaneous consumer surplus due to a price
increase by the ￿rm. NLCS(t) increases when q(t) increases. The term s(t)
:
F(t) re￿ ects the
expected revenue for the authority at time t if the cartel is discovered at this particular instant
of time. C1(T) is the terminal value (disutility) assessed by the antitrust authority if the ￿rm
is not yet caught at time T: 4 Note also that we assume that no additional costs arise after the
￿rm has been caught. This is a reasonable assumption in the context of violations of antitrust
law, since it is assumed that only monetary ￿ne can be imposed and this , on the contrary to
imprisonment, is costless for the authority.







Here the term PS(t) re￿ ects the instantaneous rents from collusion, while ￿s(t)
:
F(t) denotes
the expected punishment for the ￿rm at time t, i.e. the ￿ne times the probability of being caught.
s(t) is the instantaneous penalty at the moment the ￿rm is caught. For further analysis we
assume it is a function of both control variables and time. Note that the higher the degree
of collusion, q(t), the higher the probability to be caught for the ￿rm, and, consequently, the
higher the expected punishment. The term PScompF(t) re￿ ects the pro￿ts of the ￿rm during
the period after the conviction, when there is no price-￿xing. Consequently, the expression
PScomp is assumed to be zero. Finally, C2(T) is the terminal value (utility) of the ￿rm being
not yet convicted in cartel formation at time T.
The corresponding di⁄erential game with two players, one state variable F(t); and two
control variables, q(t) and p(t); is represented by the expressions (1)-(3). The state space is
F(t) 2 [0;1]; and the set of feasible controls is p(t) 2 [0;1] for player 1 and q(t) 2 [0;1] for
player 2.
The major di⁄erence with earlier papers on crime control (Feichtinger (1983)) is that we
introduce s(t) being the penalty imposed on the ￿rm as a function of the degree of o⁄ence, which
4From the underlying static microeconomic model of price-￿xing ( section 2.1) we derive that CS
max = 2￿
m:











where the term PS(t) re￿ ects the instantaneous producer surplus, the term CS(t) re￿ ects the instanteneous
consumer surplus, and the term CS
maxF(t) re￿ ects the expected instantaneous consumer surplus in periods after
the conviction.
9can vary over time. Moreover, the penalty could be a function of both the degree of o⁄ence
and the rate of law enforcement by the antitrust authority. This case will be considered in later
sections of the paper. Another extension compared to Feichtinger (1983) is that we determine
explicitly the instantaneous utilities for the antitrust authority and the ￿rm in the case of
price-￿xing, as functions of the degree of o⁄ence on the basis of the underling microeconomic
model.
An economically reasonable assumption would be to set salvage values to be nonnegative,
i.e. C1(T) ￿ 0;C2(T) ￿ 0: Moreover, further, in order to simplify the calculations, we assume
zero discount rate5 (r = 0).
We also assume that players make their choices simultaneously and that they present the
solutions to their control problems by Markovian strategies or open-loop Nash Equilibrium
strategies (for a reference see ,e.g., Dockner et al. (2000)).
De￿nition 1 The tuple (￿; ) of functions ￿;  : F ￿ [0;T) 7￿! Rmi
; is called a Markovian
Nash Equilibrium if, for each i 2 f1;2g; an optimal control path ui(t) of the control problem
exists and is given by the Markovian Strategy u1(t) = ￿(F(t);t) and u2(t) =  (F(t);t) :
De￿nition 2 The tuple (￿; ) of functions ￿;  : [0;T) 7￿! Rmi
; is called an open-loop Nash
Equilibrium if, for each i 2 f1;2g; an optimal control path ui(t) of the control problem exists
and is given by the open-loop Strategy u1(t) = ￿(t) and u2(t) =  (t):
In the solution of the game described above we will search for the open-loop Nash Equilibria
of the di⁄erential game. It can be shown that for this particular game the set of Markovian
(closed-loop) Nash Equilibria will coincide with the set of open-loop Nash Equilibria. The proof
will be provided in Appendix 2.
3 Analysis of the current EU and US penalty schemes.
3.1 Stylized EU penalty scheme.
In this section we consider a penalty scheme, which resembles the current European or Dutch
systems6. We model the main feature of these systems, namely that the base penalty must be
5However, the main results of the paper would not change if we relax this assumption. Except for the results
of Appendix 3 and section 6.1.4. of Appendix 1, where we were not able to ￿nd closed form solution for the
dynamics of control variables in case r > 0.
6Guidelines on the method of setting ￿nes imposed for violations of competition law in Europe can be found
in PbEG 1998, while guidelines for the setting of ￿nes in the Netherlands are described in Section 57(1) of
10proportional to the gravity of infringement or to the turnover involved in the undertaking and
should not depend on the rate of law enforcement. It should be mentioned that the functional
form described in equation (4) below does not capture all the properties of the penalty schemes,
which are determined in the current Guidelines for the setting of ￿nes (such as bigger duration
of the o⁄ence or leading role in the infringement would increase the penalty). That is why
we call this scheme ￿ Stylized EU penalty scheme￿ . Consequently, the penalty in this case is
modeled as a linear increasing function of the degree of o⁄ence, q(t):
s(q(t)) = K￿mq(t); (4)
where K is a positive constant and ￿m is the instantaneous monopoly pro￿t to the ￿rm7.
We ￿rst ￿nd an open-loop Nash equilibrium of the game described above. In Appendix 2 we
show that in this di⁄erential game candidates for open-loop Nash optimality are also candidates
for closed-loop Nash optimality. To ￿nd Nash Equilibria in open-loop strategies we ￿rst ￿nd
a tuple (￿; ) where ￿ : [0;T] 7￿! [0;1] and   : [0;T] 7￿! [0;1] are the ￿xed strategies for
antitrust authority and ￿rm respectively. ￿ corresponds to the control variable p(t); and  
corresponds to the control variable q(t):
As the static analysis in section 2.1 suggests, it is reasonable to assume concavity of the
terms ￿NLCS(t) ￿ C(p(t)) and PS(t): This allows to obtain the expressions for an interior
solution of di⁄erential game (1)-(3)8.
The solution of the problem of the ￿rm gives us the following expression being the reaction






( 0 if B￿0
B if 0<B￿1
1 if B > 1
: (6)
In (5) ￿(t) is the shadow price (costate variable) of the state variable F(t) for the ￿rm.
According to (5) the optimal degree of price-￿xing for the ￿rm decreases with decreasing
shadow price ￿(t): Moreover the higher the penalty at the instant the ￿rm is caught, the lower
Competition Act.
7The multiplier K￿
m is derived from the static optimization problem for the ￿rm. The ￿rm decides on the
level of o⁄ence given the rate of law enforcement, p, and the functional form of the penalty scheme, which is
linear. And the aim of the antitrust authority is to achieve zero price-￿xing outcome.
8However, in general all the results of the model will hold also for arbitrary concave objective functions.
9For a complete derivation of this result see appendix 1.
11the optimal rate of price-￿xing. The in￿ uence of the maximal gains from price-￿xing on the
optimal degree of price-￿xing is determined by taking the derivative of expression (5) with





￿m ￿ 0: So the optimal degree of price-￿xing by the ￿rm will increase when the
maximal gains from collusion increase. This behavior makes economic sense.
The solution of the problem of the antitrust authority gives us the following expression
being the reaction function of the antitrust authority in each period11:
p￿(t) =




( 0 if D￿0
D if 0<D￿1
1 if D > 1
: (8)
Where ￿(t) is the shadow price for the antitrust authority.
The intuition behind the formula (7) is as follows. Since the antitrust authority aims to
minimize the total loss, the adjoint variable ￿(t) measures the shadow costs of one additional
unit of probability F(t) imputed by the authority. Thus, ￿￿(t) is the shadow price by which
the state variable F is assessed by the authority. From (7) we see that a decrease in ￿(t)
results in an increase of the rate of law enforcement p. The increase in the absolute value of the
penalty K￿m also will cause an increase in the rate of law enforcement, since it becomes more
pro￿table for the antitrust authority to discover more violations. At the same time it holds
that the higher the marginal costs of law enforcement N; the lower p.
3.2 Determination of the Nash Equilibrium.
Based on the expressions (7) and (5) we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The outcome with no collusion q(t) = 0 for all t 2 [0;T] can not arise as
equilibrium strategy of the ￿rm , when the penalty schedule has the form s(q(t)) = K￿mq(t);
where K is a positive real number, which determines the steepness of the penalty scheme, and
the costs of law enforcement are a quadratic function of p(t).
Proof : (see Appendix 1 (section 6.1.3.)).
10For veri￿cation see appendix 1.
11For a complete derivation of this result see appendix 1.
12It should be also mentioned, that the unique steady state of this problem is given by q￿ = 0
and p￿ = 012: But considering the phase diagram of this problem in the (p,q)- plane we conclude
that this solution is not stable13.This fact provides an additional argument in favor of rejection
of the linear penalty scheme which does not depend on any other variables of the model, except
for the degree of price-￿xing.
The general result of the analysis of the di⁄erential game conducted in this subsection
points out the weaknesses of the penalty scheme that is linear in the degree of o⁄ence, which
is described in the European sentencing guidelines for violations of antitrust law. One of the
possible improvements would be to change the functional form of the penalty. For example, in
US sentencing guidelines it resembles a convex increasing function of the degree of o⁄ence. We
treat this case in the subsection below.
3.3 Stylized US penalty scheme.
In this section we consider a di⁄erential game where the penalty schedule is a convex function
of the degree of the o⁄ence. This schedule is given by the following expression:
s(q(t)) = K￿mq2(t): (9)
This resembles the current US system of penalties for violations of antitrust law, where the
base penalty imposed by court for the ￿rm convicted in price-￿xing will be determined as a
convex increasing function of the degree of o⁄ence, assigned to this particular violation, which
is based on the amount of turnover involved in undertaking14. Again, this system does not
exactly capture all the features of the penalties determined in US guidelines manual (such as
dependence on the duration of o⁄ence or the role in the infringement). That is why, as in the
previous subsection, we call this scheme ￿ Stylized US penalty scheme￿ . For the convex penalty
scheme Proposition 4 can be obtained. We refrain from presenting its proof, since it is similar
to the linear case15.
12For the sake of completeness we also give here the exact de￿nition of the stationary Markovian Nash equilibria.
Let us consider game with in￿nite planning horizon, e.g. T = 1: Assume also that there are two players, and
strategy space for each of them has dimension one. Now The stationary Markovian Nash equilibrium (or steady
state) is the tuple (￿; ) of time independent functions ￿;  : F 7￿! U
i for i 2 f1;2g. Where F is the state
space and U
1 and U
2 are the strategy spaces for players 1 and 2 respectively. Moreover, U
1, U
2 2 R:
13See the part on the investigation of stability in Appendix 1.
14US guidelines manual.
15The proof of the proposition 4 and investigation of the stability of the system in the long run are available
from the author upon request. Also here it holds that unique steady state given by p=q=0, is not stable.
13Proposition 4 The outcome with no collusion q(t) = 0 for all t 2 [0;T] can not arise as
equilibrium strategy of the ￿rm in the model with ￿nite horizon, when the penalty schedule is
convex i.e. s(q(t)) = K￿mq2(t); where K is a ￿xed positive real number, and the costs of law
enforcement are a quadratic function of p(t):
The deterrence with convex penalty system works better than the deterrence with a linear
penalty scheme for more grave o⁄ences, since when q is su¢ ciently high, it can be shown that
for any given probability of law enforcement it gives a lower degree of price-￿xing by the ￿rm
and, consequently, a lower damage for society. Moreover, this result once again gives support
to the argument in favor of deterrence focused not only on cartel bene￿ts but also on the harm
to the consumers caused by price-￿xing. Recall that the net losses in consumer surplus were
proportional to the squared degree of o⁄ence16.
The main implication of the model discussed in this section is the result that in the frame-
work of a di⁄erential game between the ￿rm and the antitrust authority the penalty schemes
which are used now in the EU and US legislation appear not to be as e¢ cient as desired from
the point of view of minimization of consumer loss from price-￿xing activities of the ￿rm. The
result is that, given this framework, zero collusion (full compliance) behavior is not sustainable
as a Nash Equilibrium in Markovian strategies for all periods of the time horizon, and, more-
over, this equilibrium will never arise as a long run steady state equilibrium of the model. The
reason for this is that the current penalty schemes do not allow the ￿ne to be high enough to
outweigh the accumulated expected gains from price-￿xing for colluding ￿rms. Another reason
could be that ￿nes for antitrust violations do not depend in any way on the probability of law
enforcement, which should be an important determinant of the e¢ ciency of penalty schemes
as has been mentioned in Becker (1968) and Leung (1991). In the next section we pursue this
road.





144 A penalty schedule that does prevent collusion.
4.1 Solution of the game.
Here the aim is to ￿nd an open-loop Nash equilibrium, which is also a Markovian Nash Equi-
librium of the game described above, when the penalty schedule is determined as follows 17
s(q(t);p(t)) = K￿mq(t) +
G
p(t)
with s(0;0) = 0; (10)
where G is a positive constant.
The foundation for the penalty schedule determined by expression (10) is based on the
following considerations. Looking at the FOC for the ￿rm (5) in the case when the penalty is
linear, given ￿(t) ￿ 0 for all t, we can get q(t) = 0 for all t if and only if there is some additional
strictly negative term in the numerator of the expression (5). By adding the term G
p(t) into
the penalty function we assure the appearance of this additional term in the expression for the
reaction function of the ￿rm. Note that this result has a lot in common with the well known
result of Becker (1968).
Searching for the open-loop Nash Equilibria of the game we start by solving the optimal
control problem of the ￿rm. If the antitrust authority chooses to play p(t) = ￿(t) then the









F(t) = ￿(t)q(t)[1 ￿ F(t)]
The Hamiltonian of this problem equals
H(q;F;￿) = ￿mq(t)(2￿q(t))[1￿F(t)]￿(K￿mq(t)+ G
￿(t))￿(t)q(t)(1￿F(t))+￿(t)￿(t)q(t)(1￿
F(t)); where ￿(t) is the costate variable of the problem of the ￿rm.
Solving for q(t) and ￿(t) we get:
:
￿(t) = ￿mq(t)(2 ￿ q(t)) ￿ s(t)￿(t)q(t) + ￿(t)￿(t)q(t)
q￿(t) =




( 0 if B￿0
B if 0<B￿1
1 if B > 1
: (12)
According to (11) the optimal degree of price-￿xing for the ￿rm decreases with decreasing
shadow price ￿(t): Moreover, the higher the penalty at the instant the ￿rm is caught, the lower
17For veri￿cation see Appendix 2.
15the optimal rate of price-￿xing. The in￿ uence of the maximal gains from price-￿xing on the
optimal degree of price-￿xing is determined by taking the derivative of expression (11) with





So the optimal degree of price-￿xing by the ￿rm will increase when the monopoly pro￿ts from
collusion increase. The size of the ￿xed ￿ne G negatively in￿ uences the degree of price ￿xing.
Now we move to the solution of the optimal control problem of antitrust authority. If ￿rm










F(t) = p(t) (t)[1 ￿ F(t)]
The Hamiltonian of this problem equals
H(p;F;￿) = (￿m 1
2 2(t)+Np2(t))[1￿F(t)]￿(K￿m (t)+ G
p(t))p(t) (t)(1￿F(t))+￿(t) (t)p(t)(1￿
F(t)); where ￿(t) is a costate variable of the problem of player 1.
Solving for the optimal p(t) and ￿(t); and taking into account that the control region for p
is constrained by the [0;1]￿ interval, we get:
:
￿(t) = ￿m 1
2 2(t)) + Np2(t) ￿ s(t)p(t) (t) + ￿(t) (t)p(t);
p￿(t) =




( 0 if D￿0
D if 0<D￿1
1 if D > 1
: (14)
The intuition behind this result is exactly the same as in section 3.2.
Taking into account the assumptions on the terminal values C1(T) ￿ 0;C2(T) ￿ 0 we
conclude that the transversality conditions will be as follows:
￿(T) = ￿C1(T) ￿ 0 and ￿(T) = ￿C2(T) ￿ 0: (15)
4.2 Determination of the Nash Equilibrium.
Let us investigate the stability of the system and the properties of the last period solution.
By doing this we are able to establish that, under certain conditions on the parameters of
the model, an equilibrium with zero degree of collusion in all periods can be sustained as an
open-loop or Markovian equilibrium of the game.
From (11)-(14) it can be concluded that the system of equations describing the solution of
the di⁄erential game in terms of reaction functions in the ￿nal period of the game, given that
18For veri￿cation see proof of Proposition 5.






2￿m + ￿(T)p(T) ￿ G
2￿m + 2￿mKp(T)
(17)
Studying the reaction functions of both players at each instant of time, we can conclude
that the following proposition holds:
Proposition 5 If the penalty schedule has the form s(q(t);p(t)) = K￿mq(t)+ G
p(t) with s(0;0) =
0 where K is any positive real number and G ￿ 2￿m; then the unique equilibrium has q(t) = 0
for all t 2 [0;T].
Proof:
From expression (16) it is obtained that p￿(T) = 0 if and only if q(T) = 0 ;since expression
K￿mq(T) ￿ ￿(T) can not be equal to zero due to the transversality condition (15). This can
be situated on an optimal path for the strategy of player 2, given by expression (17) if and
only if G ￿ 2￿m: Secondly, given that ￿(T) ￿ 0; the best response function q(p) for player 2 is
the constant function passing through the point (0;0), so q￿(p) = 0 for any p 2 [0;1]:
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Figure 3: Determination of the Nash Equilibrium in the model when the penalty schedule is
given by the function s(q(t);p(t)) = K￿mq(t) + G
p(t) for parameter values
K = 2;￿m = 1;N = 1 and taking ￿ = ￿1:
We can conclude that q￿(T) = 0 can be sustained as an open-loop or Markovian19 Nash
equilibrium in the last period of the game only if G ￿ 2￿m; i.e. the ￿xed penalty is high enough
to make the reaction curve of the ￿rm a horizontal line, passing through the point q = 0.
19For the proof of the fact that for this particular game the set of open loop equilibria coincides with the set
of Markovian equilibria see Appendix 2.
17In order to ￿nd equilibrium values of p￿(t) and q￿(t) in each period we can draw both
reaction functions in a (p;q) diagram at each instant of time. To ￿nd analytical expressions
for the Nash Equilibria of the game in terms of open-loop strategies for both players, we have
to ￿nd Nash Equilibria in each period t and compose the optimal path starting from the last
period.
The problem here is that expression (10) does not de￿ne the penalty in case p(t) = 0. The
penalty and, consequently, the objective functions become indeterminate when p(t) = 0: To
overcome this problem we introduce the notion of " ￿ equilibrium (or almost equilibrium):
De￿nition 6 An "￿equilibrium of any strategic-form game is a combination of randomized
strategies such that no player could expect to gain more than " by switching to any of his
feasible strategies, instead of following the randomized strategy speci￿ed for him.20
Obviously, in the equilibrium point with p￿(t) = 0 and q￿(t) = 0 for all t 2 [0;T] values of
objective functionals do not exist. Hence, as a candidate for "￿equilibrium we consider point
q￿(t) = 0 and p￿(t) = ￿ > 0 for all t 2 [0;T] ; where ￿ ! 0 + :
Now we can de￿ne the "￿equilibrium of the game by q￿(t) = 0 and p￿(t) ! 0+ for all
t 2 [0;T] and use this equilibrium in further analysis.
In order to show that p￿(t) ! 0+ and q￿(t) = 0 for all t 2 [0;T) can be sustained as an open-
loop or Markovian Nash equilibrium of this game, we need to verify that this solution satis￿es
the necessary conditions for optimality. Obviously, they are satis￿ed. Assuming F(t) 6= 1 we
can rewrite di⁄erentiated Hamiltonians as follows21:
@H(p;F;￿)





@q = 2￿m ￿ 2￿mq(t) + ￿(t)p(t) ￿ 2￿mKq(t)p(t) ￿ Gj(p=0;q=0) = 0 i⁄ G = 2￿m
Next, we prove that q(t) = 0; p(t) ! 0+ for all t 2 [0;T] is a unique equilibrium. The fact
that ￿(t) ￿ 0 for all t 2 [0;T]; ensures that q(t) = 0;p(t) ! 0+ for all t is a unique solution.
Firstly, ￿(T) > 0 can not hold, since according to the transversality condition we have
￿(T) ￿ 0: Hence, the equilibrium with q(T) = 0;p(T) ! 0+ is a unique equilibrium in period
T given G ￿ 2￿m:
We can show that the equilibrium with q(t) = 0;p(t) ! 0+ will be also unique for all
t 2 [0;T): In the problem under consideration the necessary condition for uniqueness of the
equilibrium q(t) = 0;p(t) ! 0+ for all t is the condition ￿(t) ￿ 0 for any t 2 [0;T]: Taking into
20For the reference see Myerson (2002)
21Note that in case F(t) = 1 equalities
@H(p;F;￿)
@p = 0 and
@H(q;F;￿)
@q = 0 are satis￿ed for any values of p and q.
18account the transversality condition ￿(T) ￿ 0 above we now show that ￿(t) ￿ 0 for t 2 [0;T):
Assume that there is an arbitrary t0 2 [0;T) such that ￿(t0) > 0: Then from the optimality




And from the costate equation for ￿(t) we obtain that
:




= q2(t0)￿m (1 + Kp(t0)) ￿ 0:
Hence , a non-positive terminal value given by ￿(T) = ￿C2(T) could never be reached.
Thus,
￿(t) ￿ 0 for t 2 [0;T)
Hence we can conclude that with G ￿ 2￿m the outcome with no collusion q(t) = 0 for all
t 2 [0;T] can arise as an open-loop or Markovian Nash Equilibrium solution of the game and
this equilibrium is unique23.
End of the proof of the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium.
To summarize the analysis we stress that this proposition considers the settings, where we
model the interactions between the ￿rm and antitrust authority as a di⁄erential game. In this
game the antitrust authority imposes a penalty of the form S(q(t);p(t)) = K￿mq(t) + 2￿m
p(t) at
the moment that the cartel is discovered and zero penalty if it checks and does not discover
any violation. One important feature of this schedule is that when the cartel is discovered the
penalty imposed on the ￿rm must be at least greater than twice the instantaneous monopoly
pro￿ts from price-￿xing in the industry under consideration. It turns out that this penalty
scheme is more e¢ cient than the current EU or US penalty schemes, in the sense that this
policy leads to the complete deterrence outcome. In particular, the regulator can achieve the
outcome with no price-￿xing in all the periods of the planning horizon at the lowest possible
costs.
Finally consider the in￿nite horizon problem and let us investigate the stability of the Nash
Equilibrium solution in the long run. Studying the phase diagram24 we can conclude that the
following proposition holds.
22For a complete derivation see Appendix 3.








m (1 + Kp(t
0)); which is also greater or equal than zero given that ￿(t
0) > 0:
24See ￿gure 6 in Appendix 3.
19Proposition 7 The outcome with q￿ = 0 and p￿ ! 0 is the unique long run steady state equi-
librium of the in￿nite horizon model, where the penalty is given by the expression S(q(t);p(t)) =
K￿mq(t) + 2￿m
p(t) and the costs of law enforcement for the antitrust authority are convex.
This proposition states that the equilibrium (q￿ = 0;p￿ ! 0+) is also the unique steady
state equilibrium of the di⁄erential game with penalty schedule given by S(q;p) = K￿mq+ 2￿m
p :
Complete proof of this fact will be provided in Appendix 3. Referring to Feichtinger (1983)
we de￿ne the game under consideration as a state-separable game, i.e. a game which has the
property that the state variable is absent in the maximization conditions as well as in the
adjoint equations. For such a game the system of di⁄erential equations for the Nash-optimal
controls can be derived, as will be shown in Appendix 3. Also, the qualitative behavior of
the optimal solution can be obtained from a phase diagram analysis in the (p;q)- plane, but
a closed-form solution of the system of the di⁄erential equations for the Nash equilibrium of
the game under consideration still cannot be calculated due to the complicated structure of
objective functions25.
Here we give a phase portrait in the (p;q)￿ plane of the system of di⁄erential equations
which describes the long run dynamics of the system in terms of control variables. The domain
of the controls is determined by the square [0;1] ￿ [0;1] . We also show in Appendix 3, that







Figure 4: Phase portrait in (p,q)-space for the model where penalty schedule is given by
s(q(t);p(t)) = K￿mq(t) + G
p(t) for the set of parameters K = 2;N = 1;G = 2, ￿m = 1:
Considering the dynamics of the system in this domain, we conclude that for certain initial
values of control variables, in particular q > p
p
2 (in the example where K = 2; ￿m = 1;N =
1;G = 2￿m = 2) or q >
q
2N
￿mp (in general case) (or simply for the points in the (p;q)-
plane above line OA in the graph above) with arbitrary values of parameters N and ￿m and
25See Appendix 3.
20Fx = 2￿m; the system will always converge to the point (0;0). Moreover starting in any
point with characteristics q ￿
q
2N
￿mp (below line OA) will bring the system into the point
(1;1), which is clearly suboptimal compared to the solution (0;0). So we can conclude that
q￿ = 0;p￿ ! 0 is the unique stable steady state solution of the system of di⁄erential equations
(26), (27). Moreover, this result is not sensitive to the changes of the values of the parameters
of the model.
5 Conclusions.
In this paper we analyze dynamic interactions between the antitrust authority and a ￿rm in-
volved in a cartel. We develop a model which can be used to study dynamic optimal enforcement
of competition law. We can summarize the results of the paper as follows.
One main result is that the penalty schemes, which are used now in the EU and US legisla-
tion, appear not to be as e¢ cient as desired from the point of view of minimization of consumer
loss from price-￿xing activities of the ￿rm. In particular, we prove the result that zero collusion
(full compliance) behavior is not sustainable as a Nash Equilibrium in Markovian strategies.
The reason is that the current penalty schemes do not allow the ￿ne to be high enough to
outweigh the accumulated expected gains from price-￿xing for colluding ￿rms. An additional
reason could be that ￿nes for antitrust violations do not depend in any way on the probabil-
ity of law enforcement, which should be an important determinant of the e¢ ciency of penalty
schemes. The latter result was obtained by Becker (1968) and also by Leung (1991).
Furthermore, we determine a penalty system, that is e¢ cient from the point of view of the
possibility of complete deterrence of cartel formation in a dynamic setting. We ￿nd that there
is a possibility to achieve the socially desirable outcome, i.e. the outcome with no price-￿xing
in all the periods of planning horizon, only with a very speci￿c form of the penalty scheme.
The amount of ￿ne should be an increasing function of the degree of o⁄ence and it should be
negatively related to the probability of law enforcement, which is related to Becker￿ s (1968)
result. An interesting implication is that in any case, whatever the degree of o⁄ence is, the
penalty should be greater than twice the per period maximal gains from price-￿xing for the
￿rm. This in some sense con￿rms the suggestion which has been made in the beginning of the
paper that, indeed, the penalty should be related not only to the gains from price-￿xing for the
￿rm but also to the loss in consumer surplus due to price-￿xing, which is approximately twice
the monopoly pro￿ts in case of full collusion.
21There is a number of possible extensions of the model described in this paper. It seems
reasonable to assume that the duration of the game is large. Thus it might be interesting to
consider also the case of an in￿nite time horizon in more details and try to ￿nd a more general
solution for this setting. In this case the salvage values must be equal to zero and the discount
rate must be strictly positive for reasons of convergence of the objective functionals. The
introduction of new state variables such as the o⁄ender￿ s criminal record or the accumulated gain
from cartel formation could give new insights for the determination of optimal penalty schemes
for antitrust law violations. New insights may also be gained by looking at heterogeneity
among the violating ￿rms and, consequently, di⁄erent penalty schedules for o⁄ences of di⁄erent
gravity and di⁄erentiation between industries can also help to improve the deterrence power of
the current penalty schemes for violations of competition law.
6 Appendixes.
6.1 Appendix 1. Complete solution of the di⁄erential game with linear
penalty schedule26.
6.1.1 Solution of the problem of player 2 (￿rm).
Let￿ s start by solving the optimal control problem of player 2. If player 1 chooses to play




e￿rt[￿mq(t)(2 ￿ q(t))[1 ￿ F(t)] ￿ s(t)￿(t)q(t)(1 ￿ F(t))]dt + C2(T)[1 ￿ F(T)]
s:t:
:
F(t) = ￿(t)q(t)[1 ￿ F(t)]
F(t) 2 [0;1] and F(T) is free. This implies a transversality condition of the following form:
￿(T) = ￿C2(T); where ￿(t) is the costate variable of the above problem .
F(0) = 0 and q(t) 2 [0;1]
Now ￿(t) is assumed to be ￿xed functions and PS(t) is determined from the subsection 2.2.
The Hamiltonian of this problem equals
H(q;F;￿) = ￿mq(t)(2 ￿ q(t))[1 ￿ F(t)] ￿ s(t)￿(t)q(t)(1 ￿ F(t)) + ￿(t)￿(t)q(t)(1 ￿ F(t))
Solving for q(t) and ￿(t) we get:
26For the sake of completeness we solve this game under assumption that r ￿ 0. So, that the results stated in
section 3.1 (under assumption r = 0) will hold automatically.
22(i)
:
￿(t) ￿ r￿(t) = ￿
@H(q;F;￿)
@F : This implies
:
￿(t) ￿ r￿(t) = ￿mq(t)(2 ￿ q(t)) ￿ s(t)￿(t)q(t) +
￿(t)￿(t)q(t)
(ii) q￿(t) is such that it maximizes H(q;F;￿) on q 2 [0;1]:
(iii) F(T) is free, this implies transversality condition of the following form: ￿(T) = ￿C2(T)
Given s(q(t)) = K￿mq(t) with K 2 (0;1) i.e. K is any positive real number (ii) implies
@H(q;F;￿)
@q = 2￿m ￿ 2￿mq(t) + ￿(t)￿(t) ￿ 2￿mKq(t)￿(t):
So equation 2￿m ￿ 2￿mq + ￿￿ ￿ 2￿mKq￿ = 0 gives us ￿ = 2￿m ￿1+q+Kq￿
￿
Substituting this expression into the costate equation we get:
:
￿ = r￿ + ￿mq(2 ￿ q) ￿ ￿mKq￿q + 2￿m(
￿1+q+Kq￿
￿ )￿q = r￿ + ￿mq2 + ￿mKq2￿
@H(q;F;￿)
@q = 0 implies q￿(t) =
2￿m+￿(t)￿(t)





Proof of ￿(t) ￿ 0 for all t 2 [0;T]:
The transversality conditions are provided by ￿(T) = ￿C1(T) for player 1 (antitrust-
authority) and by ￿(T) = ￿C2(T) for player 2 (￿rm). Given C1(T) ￿ 0 and C2(T) ￿ 0
we have that ￿(T) ￿ 0 and ￿(T) ￿ 0; where ￿(T) and ￿(T) are values of the costate variables
of the game in the last period.
Taking into account the conditions above we can show that ￿(t) ￿ 0 for t 2 [0;T):
Assume that there is arbitrary t0 2 [0;T) such that ￿(t0) > 0: Then, according to the
concavity of PS(q) we obtain from the costate equation for ￿(t) that
:
￿(t0) = ￿(t0)r+￿mq(t0)2+
￿mKq(t0)2p(t0) ￿ 0: Hence , a non-positive terminal value given by ￿(T) = ￿C2(T) could be
never reached. Thus,
￿(t) ￿ 0 for t 2 [0;T)
End of the proof.




Np2 is ambiguous, it holds that in general ￿(t) has no unique sign.
6.1.2 Solution of the problem of player 1 (antitrust authority).
Now we move to the solution of optimal control problem of player 1. If player 2 chooses to play




e￿rt(NLCS(t) + Np2(t))[1 ￿ F(t)] ￿ s(t)
:
F(t)]dt + C1(T)[1 ￿ F(T)]
s:t:
:
F(t) = p(t) (t)[1 ￿ F(t)]
23F(t) 2 [0;1] and F(T) is free. This implies a transversality condition of the following form:
￿(T) = ￿C1(T); where ￿(t) is the costate variable of the above problem.
F(0) = 0 and p(t) 2 [0;1]
Now  (t) is assumed to be ￿xed function.
The Hamiltonian of this problem equals
H(p;F;￿) = (￿m 1
2 2(t)+Np2(t))[1￿F(t)]￿s(t)p(t) (t)(1￿F(t))+￿(t) (t)p(t)(1￿F(t))










(ii) p￿(t) is such that it maximizes H(p;F;￿) on p 2 [0;1]:
(iii) F(T) is free, this implies transversality condition of the following form: ￿(T) = ￿C1(T)
(ii) and s(q(t)) = K￿mq(t) implies
@H(p;F;￿)
@p = 2Np(t)￿K￿m (t) (t)+￿(t) (t) = 0 . This implies p￿(t) =
(K￿m (t)￿￿(t)) (t)
2N =




Solution of the equation 2Np ￿ K￿m   + ￿  = 0 gives ￿ =
￿2Np+K￿m 2
  :
Substituting this expression into the costate equation we get:
:
￿(t) ￿ r￿(t) = ￿m 1
2 2 + Np2 ￿ K￿m p  + (￿
2Np￿K￿m 2
  ) p = 1
2￿m 2 ￿ Np2
6.1.3 Proof of proposition 3.
Consider the value of the control variable of the antitrust authority in the last period of the game
given by expression (7). It is clear that p￿(T) = 0 if and only if q(T) = 0: But this contradicts
to the optimal path for the last period strategy of player 2 , which is given by expression (5):
This implies that p￿(T) = 0 and q￿(T) = 0 does not constitute a Nash equilibrium of the game
in the last period for arbitrary salvage value C2(T). Consequently, strategy q(t) = 0 for all t can
not be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in open-loop or Markovian strategies with C2(T) ￿ 2￿m
p(T)
and ￿(t) ￿ 2￿m
p(t) for all t 2 [0;T).
We may also notice an interesting argument that follows from the fact that transversality
condition implies that ￿(T) = ￿C2(T): Then we get q￿(T) ￿ 0 for any p(T) 2 [0;1] if and
only if ￿(T) = ￿C2(T) ￿ ￿2￿m
p(T): (Note that this result does not hold in general settings with
arbitrary terminal value of the ￿rm.) This implies that the reaction function of the ￿rm in
the last period can pass through origin only when C2(T) the terminal utility of the ￿rm being
not yet convicted in cartel formation at time T is greater or equal than 2￿m
p(T). So the outcome
24with no collusion in the last period and consequently with no price-￿xing in all the preceding
periods can arise in equilibrium only under very special circumstances, i.e. when C2(T) ￿ 2￿m
p(T)
and ￿(t) ￿ ￿2￿m
p(t) for all t 2 [0;T), which means the terminal utility of the ￿rm being not yet
convicted in cartel formation at time T must be equal exactly the absolute penalty which could
be imposed on the ￿rm in the static case in order to block any degree of price-￿xing27 and also
the path of the costate variable for the ￿rm should follow exactly ￿(t) = ￿2￿m
p(t) or lie below.
So, here we can observe analogies with the static model.
So, we have that q￿(t) = 0 for some p(t) 2 [0;1] if and only if ￿(t) ￿ ￿2￿m
p(t) for all t 2 [0;T]:
But in this case the dynamics of the system rules out the result with p(t) = 0 for all t 2 [0;T]:
This can be shown as follows.
Consider ￿2￿m
p(t) < 0 for all t 2 [0;T] i⁄ p(t) > 0. This implies
:
￿(t) = ￿mq(t)2 +
￿mKq(t)2p(t) = 0 for all t 2 [0;T]. Thus
￿
p(t) = 0 and p(t) > 0: This implies p(T) > 0.
Consequently, the outcome with q(t) = 0 for all t 2 [0;T] can be sustained in a Nash equilib-
rium of this game with ￿(T) = ￿C2(T) ￿ ￿2￿m
p(T) only when p(t) > 0 for some t 2 [0;T]; which
is clearly suboptimal , since there is unnecessary waste of resources compared to the outcome
with q(t) = 0 and p(t) = 0 for all t 2 [0;T]:
END OF THE PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.
6.1.4 Investigation of stability of the system when penalty is given by the expres-
sion s(q) = K￿mq:
From the solution of the problem of the ￿rm (setting r = 0) we obtain
￿ =





￿(t) = 2￿mq ￿ ￿mq2 ￿ (K￿mq)pq + (
￿2￿m+2￿mq+2K￿mqp
p )pq = q2￿m (1 + Kp)








2￿mq2 + Np2 ￿ K￿mq2p + (
￿2Np+K￿mq2
q )qp = 1
2￿mq2 ￿ Np2





tively we obtain following system of equations:
27Recall section 2.2: s
0(q) =
2￿m
p : =) s(q) =
2￿m
p q;i.e. the penalty imposed on the ￿rm colluding with the
degree 1 (earning monopoly pro￿ts) must be at least double of monopoly pro￿ts.
252p￿mq0 + 2K￿mp2q0 + 2p0￿m ￿ 2p0￿mq
p2 = q2￿m (1 + Kp) (20)




￿mq2 ￿ Np2 (21)




substituting p0 into (20) and solving for q0 we get q0 = 1
2q2 ￿mq2￿￿mq3￿2Np2+4qNp2+2Np3qK
2Kp2qN+K￿mq2￿K￿mq3+2Np








Solving the system of equations above for p0 = 0 and q0 = 0 we get that solution p = 0,
q = 0 is also a steady state equilibrium of the game described in section 3, i.e. when penalty
is given by expression S(q) = K￿mq. But after careful analysis of the phase diagram of this
system we can conclude that the equilibrium p = 0, q = 0 is not stable for some policy relevant
values of the parameters of the system.
Given parameters are ￿m = 1;N = 2;K = 0:5 and given the domain of the control variables








Figure 5: Phase portrait in (p,q)-space for the model with linear penalty schedule and convex
costs of law enforcement for the set of parameters K = 0:5;N = 2; ￿m = 1:
Where OA is the locus where variable p changes its dynamics and OB is the locus where
variable q changes its dynamics.
By studying the phase diagram we can conclude that solution p￿ = 0, q￿ = 0 can not be
stable equilibrium, i.e. equilibrium to which system converges in the long run.
6.2 Appendix 2.
In this appendix we show that for the games described in sections 3, 4 and 5 the candidates
for open-loop Nash optimality are also candidates for closed-loop Nash optimality and hence
26the open-loop strategies are also optimal in the set of closed loop strategies.
We have already mentioned, that referring to Feichtinger (1983) we can de￿ne the game
under consideration as a state-separable game, i.e. the game which has the property of the
absence of the state variable from the maximum conditions as well as from the adjoint equations.
For such a games the system of di⁄erential equations for the Nash-optimal controls can be
derived and also the qualitative behavior of the optimal solution can be obtained from a phase
diagram analysis in the (p;q)- plane.
According to Feichtinger (1983), in state-separable di⁄erential games the candidates for
open-loop Nash optimality are also candidates for closed-loop Nash optimality. The strategies
are independent of the state variable because neither the Hamiltonian-maximizing conditions
nor the adjoint equations depend on state variable F. Thus, the open-loop strategies are also
optimal in the set of closed loop strategies. Usually it is shown by verifying the su¢ cient
conditions for closed-loop Nash equilibrium controls as in Leitmann and Stalford (1974).
For the particular game described in section 3 of the paper the procedure of verifying the
su¢ cient conditions will be as follows.
Recall the de￿nition of Markovian Nash Equilibria given in section 2.1. So searching for
closed-loop equilibria we assume that the choice of the control variable by each player in the
next period will depend on the realization of state variable and also that both players can
observe this realization. In that case the optimal strategies of player 1 (antitrust authority)
and player2 (￿rm) must be respectively p(t) = ￿(F(t);t) and q(t) =  (F(t);t):






Now we substitute q￿(t) and p￿(t) into H2(q;F;￿) and H1(p;F;￿): Then the Maximized
Hamiltonians will have the following form:
H2￿(q;F;￿) = ￿mq￿(t)(2￿q￿(t))[1￿F(t)]￿s(t)￿(t)q￿(t)(1￿F(t))+￿(t)￿(t)q￿(t)(1￿F(t))
H1￿(p;F;￿) = (￿m 1
2 2(t)+Np￿2(t))[1￿F(t)]￿s(t)p￿(t) (t)(1￿F(t))+￿(t) (t)p￿(t)(1￿
F(t))
Recall also that in state-separable game described above adjoint equations do not depend
on state variable and, consequently, costate variables will not depend on state variable as well.
Taking above considerations into account we can notice that the Maximized Hamiltonian
functions of both players are linear ( and hence concave ) with respect to the state variable.





nondegenerate Markovian Nash Equilibria of the game in section 2.2. Since q￿(t) and p￿(t) do
27not depend on F(t) this open-loop Nash equilibrium of this game could be also regarded as a
Nash Equilibrium of a di⁄erential game in which both players have full Markovian information.
The same reasoning holds for the model in section 4.
6.3 Appendix 3. Calculation of steady states in the model where penalty is
given by expression s(q;p) = K￿mq + 2￿m
p .
In this appendix we verify that the equilibrium (q￿ = 0;p￿ = 0) is also unique steady state
equilibrium of the di⁄erential game with penalty schedule given by s(q;p) = K￿mq + 2￿m
p .
Re￿ring to Fiechtinger (1983) we de￿ne the game under consideration as a state-separable game.
For such a games we generally derive the system of di⁄erential equations for the Nash-optimal
controls. But since objective functions of this game are quite complicated expressions in terms
of control variables and co-state variables the stability of the system can not be investigated
with the help of general techniques such as evaluation of the trace and determinant of the
Jacobian matrix. So, to investigate the qualitative behavior of the optimal solution we use a
phase diagram analysis in the (p,q)- plane. Unfortunately, a closed-form solution of the system
of the di⁄erential equations for the Nash equilibrium of the game under consideration still can
not be calculated due to the complicated structure of objective functions.
To simplify the calculations we assume that there is no discounting. Unfortunately, we were
not able to obtain closed form expressions even for dynamics of control values in case r > 0.
However, we can presume that if r > 0 the e⁄ect of the penalty should be even stronger, since
accumulated expected future gain from price-￿xing for the ￿rm would be less.
The solution of the problem of player 2 gives
￿ =





￿(t) = 2￿mq ￿ ￿mq2 ￿ (K￿mq + G
p )pq + (
￿2￿m+2￿mq+2K￿mqp+G
p )pq = q2￿m (1 + Kp)








2￿mq2 + Np2 ￿ K￿mq2p ￿ qG + (
￿2Np+K￿mq2
q )qp = 1
2￿mq2 ￿ Np2 ￿ qG





tively we obtain following system of equations:
2p￿mq0 + 2K￿mp2q0 + 2p0￿m ￿ 2p0￿mq ￿ p0G
p2 = q2￿m (1 + Kp) (24)




￿mq2 ￿ Np2 ￿ qG (25)





2 q2 ￿ 4￿mNp2 ￿ 4￿mqG ￿ 2(￿m)
2 q3 + 8￿mqNp2 + 3￿mq2G + 2GNp2 + 2qG2 + 4￿mqNp3K
4K￿mp2qN + 2K (￿m)
2 q2 + 4￿mNp ￿ 2(￿m)
2 q3K ￿ GK￿mq2 ￿ 2GNp
(26)
from (24) it follows
p0 = ￿mq2p
K2￿mq2p2 + 4Np2 + 4Np3K ￿ ￿mq2 + 2qG + 2qGpK
4K￿mp2qN + 2K (￿m)
2 q2 + 4￿mNp ￿ 2(￿m)
2 q3K ￿ GK￿mq2 ￿ 2GNp
(27)
In order to be able to conduct more transparent analysis we make assumptions about the
parameters of the model. First, we normalize monopoly pro￿ts to 1, i.e. ￿m = 1; then
parameter of the penalty scheme G = 2￿m = 2: Moreover the costs of law enforcement should
be proportional to the amounts of extra gains from price-￿xing in every particular industry,
since the more the ￿rm has resources the more e¢ cient it will be in hiding the violation and
if violation is found the more fears will be the battle in the court, consequently the more
resources the antitrust authority has to spend in order to catch and sew the ￿rm. Taking the
above considerations into account I assume N ￿ = ￿m = 1: Parameter K can be equal to 2 as
in static settings or less, this does not in￿ uence neither the location of the steady state, no the
dynamics of the system around steady state.
This is remarkable, that there is one location of steady state which is not in￿ uenced by the
values of parameters of the system at all , which is in the point p = 0;q = 0. This can be seen
immediately from the system (24), (25).
Given parameters values K = 2;N = 1;F = 2;￿m = 1
q0 = 1
4q2 4q￿q2+4p2+4p3




Considering the partial derivatives of the expressions above we can not infer any information
about the Jacobian matrix of this system. So no conclusion can be given by evaluating the trace
and determinant of the Jacobian matrix. Consequently, another algorithm should be applied.
Constructing the phase diagram of the above system in the (p;q)-plane, we get the Figure
6.






















Figure 6: Complete phase portrait in (p,q)-space for the model where penalty schedule is given
by s(q(t);p(t)) = K￿mq(t) + G
p(t) for the set of parameters K = 2;N = 1;F = 2, ￿m = 1:
In this diagram the locuses where variable q changes sign are
q = 0; q = 2 + 2
p
(1 + p2 + p3); q = 2 ￿ 2
p
(1 + p2 + p3); q =
2 p
2p; q = ￿
2 p
2p:
And the locuses where variable p changes sign are





(1 ￿ 2p3 + p2)
￿










2p; q = ￿
2 p
2p.
Recall, the domain of the controls is determined as (p;q) 2 [0;1] ￿ [0;1]: Considering the
dynamics of the system in this domain, we conclude that for certain initial values of control
variables, in particular q >
2 p




￿mp (in general case) with arbitrary
values of parameters N and ￿m and G = 2￿m; the system will always converge to the point




￿mp will bring the system into
the point (1;1), which is clearly suboptimal compared to the solution (0;0). So we can conclude
that q￿ = 0;p￿ = 0 is stable steady state solution of the system of di⁄erential equations (26),
(27). Moreover this result is not sensitive to the changes of the values of the parameters of the
system (26), (27).
Consider the values of objective functionals for both players in points (0,0) and (1,1).
in case p(t) = 0;q(t) = 0 for all t2 [0;T] we get
:
F(t) = p(t)q(t)[1 ￿ F(t)]jp=0;q=0 = 0 and F(0) = 0 =) F(t) = 0 for all t 2 [0;T]
in case p(t) = 1;q(t) = 1 for all t2 [0;T] we get
:
F(t) = p(t)q(t)[1 ￿ F(t)]jp=1;q=1 = 1￿F and F(0) = 0 =) F(t) = 1￿e￿t for all t 2 [0;T]
Thus, J2j(0;0) = C2(T) and J2j(1;1) = (K + 1)￿m(e￿T ￿ 1) + C2(T)[e￿T]
30(K + ￿m)(e￿T ￿ 1) + C2(T)[e￿T] < C2(T)





J1j(1;1) = 2￿mT ￿ ((3
2 + K)￿m ￿ N)(e￿T ￿ 1)
2￿mT ￿ ((3
2 + K)￿m ￿ N)(e￿T ￿ 1) < 2￿mT when N > (3
2 + K)￿m:
So for non-benevolent regulator the result will depend on the magnitude of costs of control
and penalty which can be collected given current penalty scheme. If it is very costly to check,
then the outcome with zero price-￿xing is preferred.
In terms of minimization of loss of consumer surplus (the regulator is benevolent and does
















2￿m(e￿T ￿ 1) = total loss in CSj(1;1) > 0
So we can conclude that the outcome (0,0), which is policy target of antitrust authority, will
be also preferred by the ￿rm when the penalty is given by the expression S(q;p) = K￿mq+ 2￿m
p :
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